ＮＳＮＳは核兵器開発の窓口を日本側の電力各社が担っていたと公表！小出裕章氏（毎日）
事故後も原発を推進する理由として「核兵器に転用できるプルトニウムを保持したいとする国家的欲望がそこにある」と指摘2012年4月９日
米国の国家安全保障問題専門通信社のＮＳＮＳ（ National Security News
Service）が１９９１年以来、２０年がかりの調査をした結果
米国のレーガン政権が核技術などの国外移転を禁ずる連邦法（カーター政権下、制定の原子力法）をなおざりにし、日本が原子力の平和利用の名の下に、
核兵器の材料となる軍事級のプルトニウムを７０トンも備蓄するのを手助けしていたことを明らかにした。
米側は日本が１９６０年代から核開発の秘密計画を保持しているのをＣＩＡなどの諜報活動で確認していながら、米国内で頓挫したプルトニウム増殖炉の設備や技術の日本への移転を認めるとともに、国防総省の反対を抑え込んで、英仏からの再処理プルトニウム海上輸送を容認。
キッカケは
レーガン政権による、このプルトニウム対日支援の直接のキッカケは、１９８４年の米ウエスチンブハウス社の中国に売り渡し。
これに抗議する日本側を宥めるために、レーガンの「原子力の右腕」と言われた、リチャード・ケネディが工作に動いた。
合意された日米協定は、日米の科学者が５年間にわたって研究協力を行ない、米国から輸出された核燃料（の再処理）について、３０年間にわたり、日本のフリーハンドを認める内容。
日本が米英の再処理施設に委託して使用済み核燃料から抽出したプルトニウムを日本まで輸送することも同時に認められた。
日本の権力者に核開発（核武装）の明確な意志があり、
そのためのプルトニウム生産のテクノロジー、及びハードウエアを、国民が知らないところで、ひそかに米側から受けとっていたことは、きわめて重大な問題。
ＮＳＮＳの報道はまた、日本の宇宙開発が核の運搬手段開発の隠れ蓑であり、また
１９９１年には、日本の諜報機関が旧ソ連のＳＳ２０ミサイルの設計図とハードウエアに入手に成功している、とも報じている。
ＮＳＮＳはさらに、日米プルトニウム協定でも、日本側の窓口を電力各社が担うなど、核開発ではなく、あくまで「民生利用」のカモフラージュが施されていた、と指摘している。
フクイチ事故の陰には、日本政府の裏と表の二重の原子力政策があった！（日本の秘密核武装の破壊が攻撃理由）アメリカは日本が（アメリカの管理のもとに）核兵器を作ることを許しています。
その理由→①高速炉『常陽』と『もんじゅ』の使用済み燃料を再処理する技術をアメリカは日本に売ったことで明らかです。（これは、大きさが10センチ程度の小さい遠心分離機ですが、使用済み燃料の硝酸溶液から軍用プルトニウムを抽出するために必要な技術）
②アメリカはもんじゅの建設を認めた。
③兵器級Puを抽出する特殊再処理工場（RETF）の建設も認めた。http://ikeda102.blog40.fc2.com/blog-entry-680.html米国の安全保障問題メディア 「ＮＳＮＳ」
２０年がかりの調査報道で暴露 米政府 日本の軍事級プルトニウム ７０トン備蓄を支援・容認 ／拡散防止の連邦法があるにもかかわらず、増殖炉のテクノロジー・ハードウエアを日本へ売却／ レーガン政権下 ＣＩＡが日本政府の核武装秘密決定を確認しながら ／核運搬手段 日本諜報機関 １９９１年 旧ソ連 ＳＳ２０ミサイルの設計図などを入手
◇ ＮＳＮＳ電子版 United
States Circumvented Laws To Help Japan Accumulate Tons of Plutonium → http://www.dcbureau.org/201204097128/national-security-news-service/united-states-circumvented-laws-to-help-japan-accumulate-tons-of-plutonium.html
◇ 大沼のソースはＥＮＥニュース（ＮＳＮＳ電子版記事で確認！）
NSNS:
Secret Japan nuclear bomb program covered up using nuclear power industry ―
Enough to build arsenal larger than China, India and Pakistan combined
→ http://enenews.com/report-secret-japan-nuclear-bomb-program-covered-up-by-nuclear-power-industry-enough-to-build-arsenal-larger-than-china-india-and-pakistan-combined
＃
米国の国家安全保障問題専門通信社のＮＳＮＳ（
National Security News
Service）は９日、米国のレーガン政権が核技術などの国外移転を禁ずる連邦法（カーター政権下、制定の原子力法）をなおざりにし、日本が原子力の平和利用の名の下に、核兵器の材料となる軍事級のプルトニウムを７０トンも備蓄するのを手助けしていたことを明らかにする、１９９１年以来、２０年がかりの調査結果を報じた。
それによると、米側は日本が１９６０年代から核開発の秘密計画を保持しているのをＣＩＡなどの諜報活動で確認していながら、米国内で頓挫したプルトニウム増殖炉の設備や技術の日本への移転を認めるとともに、国防総省の反対を抑え込んで、英仏からの再処理プルトニウム海上輸送を容認さえしていた。
この米国による「プルトニウム対日支援」は、１９８８年に米上院が批准した日米原子力協定によって承認されたものだが、ＮＳＮＳによると、発端はカーター政権時代に遡る。
米海軍の原子力の技術者で、核問題に精通したカーター大統領は、サウスカロライナ州のサバンナ・バレーやワシントン州のハンフォードの核施設で、米国が続けていたプルトニウム生産の増殖炉研究を停止する決断を下すとともに、核技術・設備の国外移転を禁じる「１９７８年核非拡散法（原子力法）」を制定した。
これにショックを受けたのはサバンナ・バレーのクリンチ・リバー増殖炉を中心にプルトニウム増殖の研究開発をあたってきた米国の原子力推進派。
カーター政権に続くレーガン政権下、巻き返しを図り、核武装を狙って兵器級プルトニウムの備蓄を進めようとする日本側に、サバンナ・バレーのクリンチ・リバー増殖炉で蓄積した増殖技術や遠心分離器など設備を日本側に売り渡す日米原子力協定の締結に漕ぎつけた。
レーガン政権による、このプルトニウム対日支援の直接のキッカケは、１９８４年の米ウエスチンブハウス社の中国に売り渡し。
これに抗議する日本側を宥めるために、レーガンの「原子力の右腕」と言われた、リチャード・ケネディが工作に動いた。
米国のＣＩＡ、ＮＳＡは盗聴など諜報活動により、日本政府は１９６９年、トップレベルで、「必要とあらば、外国からどんなに圧力をかけられようと、核兵器開発の技術的・財源的な手段を維持する」秘密決定していたことを知っていたが、ＣＩＡはこの日米秘密合意から干されていたという。
合意された日米協定は、日米の科学者が５年間にわたって研究協力を行ない、米国から輸出された核燃料（の再処理）について、３０年間にわたり、日本のフリーハンドを認める内容。
日本が米英の再処理施設に委託して使用済み核燃料から抽出したプルトニウムを日本まで輸送することも同時に認められた。
このプルトニウム輸送については国防総省がハイジャクなどを恐れて洋上輸送に反対（一時、空輸も検討）したが、国防総省内の知日派などが動いて、容認されることになった。
ＮＳＮＳのこの調査報道記事は、高速増殖炉「もんじゅ」の事故などに触れているが、米国が売り渡した増殖技術、遠心分離機など設備が、日本でどのようなかたちで生かされ（あるいは生かすのに失敗し）、使われたか（使うのに失敗したか）までは踏み込んでいない。
しかし、日本の権力者にの核開発（核武装）の明確な意志があり、そのためのプルトニウム生産のテクノロジー、及びハードウエアを、国民が知らないところで、ひそかに米側から受けとっていたことは、きわめて重大な問題である。
ＮＳＮＳの報道はまた、日本の宇宙開発が核の運搬手段開発の隠れ蓑であり、また１９９１年には、日本の諜報機関が旧ソ連のＳＳ２０ミサイルの設計図とハードウエアに入手に成功している、とも報じている。
ＮＳＮＳはさらに、日米プルトニウム協定でも、日本側の窓口を電力各社が担うなど、核開発ではなく、あくまで「民生利用」のカモフラージュが施されていた、と指摘している。
フクイチ事故の陰には、日本政府の裏と表の二重の原子力政策があった！
フクイチ事故の責任追及は、当然ながら、日本の当局による核開発疑惑の解明へと向かわなければならない。
Posted
by 大沼安史 at 07:27 午後 | Permalinkhttp://hiroakikoide.wordpress.com/2011/12/29/mainichi-dec29/12月29日 核兵器に転用できるプルトニウムを保持したいとする国家的欲望がそこにある
小出裕章（毎日）
2011年12月29日、小出裕章氏のコメントが毎日新聞に掲載されました。
▼東日本大震災：福島第１原発事故 「収束は見せかけ」 小出・京大助教が講演 ／福岡
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毎日ｊｐ(毎日新聞)
＝＝＝＝＝
辺野古評価書提出 知事「県外」一層固く
東日本大震災：福島第１原発事故 「収束は見せかけ」 小出・京大助教が講演 ／福岡
京都大原子炉実験所助教、小出裕章さん（６２）がこのほど、小倉北区真鶴の真鶴会館で講演し、東京電力福島第１原発事故について報告。野田佳彦首相が１６日に宣言した「冷温停止状態」に対し「本来の冷温停止とは似て非なるもの。事故が収束しているように見せかけている」と断じた。
「原発の廃炉を求める北九州市民の会」の主催。約４５０人が参加した。
小出さんは福島県の広大な範囲が汚染された実態を示し「福島原発事故を起こした東電と、運転を与えた国に責任がある」と声を強め「原子力村」の既得権者たちを批判。事故後も原発を推進する理由として「核兵器に転用できるプルトニウムを保持したいとする国家的欲望がそこにある」と指摘した。
また、節電を呼びかける広報にも、火力と水力の設備容量だけで最大需要が賄えてきた資料を提示。原発再稼働に「地ならし」を進めているとして電力会社と国の姿勢を批判した。【林田英明】
〔北九州版〕http://www51.tok2.com/home/slicer93190/10-5047.html多くの日本人は、日本の核武装はアメリカが許さないと考えています。
しかし、アメリカはすでに方針を変更しています。
日本がアメリカの管理のもとに核兵器を作ることを許しています。
そのことは、高速炉『常陽』と『もんじゅ』の使用済み燃料を再処理する技術をアメリカは日本に売ったことで明らかです。
これは、大きさが10センチ程度の小さい遠心分離機ですが、使用済み燃料の硝酸溶液から軍用プルトニウムを抽出するために必要な技術です。
軍用プルトニウムを現存の再処理工場で抽出することは、臨界の危険があるのです。
そこで、このように小さい抽出装置が必要なのです。
この軍用プルトニウムの再処理工場RETFが現在東海村の再処理工場の隣に建設中です。http://moebbs.net/test/read.cgi/22ch/1284562022/☆アメリカは日本の核を容認する筈がないと言い続ける人達がいる。
たしかに昔はそうだった。イギリスから買った最初の原発、東海村の黒鉛炉の使用済み燃料の日本での再処理を許さなかった。
カーター大統領の時代には、日本がカナダから重水炉を買うことを妨害した。
兵器級Puの製造を日本にさせないためである。
しかし、最近は違う。アメリカはもんじゅの建設を認めただけでなく、
そのブランケットから兵器級Puを抽出する特殊再処理工場（RETF）の建設も認めた。
そして、そのための軍用小型遠心抽出器を動燃に販売した。
このRETFが完成すれば、日本はいつでも核兵器を生産できることになった。
☆兵器級プルトニウム239で爆縮型の小型化可能の核兵器が出来ます。
http://www.kageshobo.co.jp/main/syohyou/kakushitekakubusou.html
槌田氏の主張は、アメリカ政府は1970年代までは日本の核開発を一貫して妨害してきたが、1980年代のレーガン政権以降方針を変更して常陽ともんじゅのブランケット燃料から軍用プルトニウムを抽出することのできる特殊再処理工場（ＲＥＴＦ）の建設を認めた。それは、中国の核が強大となり、小型化、多弾頭化が進んだので、米中の核戦争となった場合にアメリカが核攻撃を受けるおそれがあり、日本を限定的に核武装させることで、そのおそれを避けることができるとされている（20－21頁）。
このＲＥＴＦ計画は1995年のもんじゅナトリウム漏れ事故、1995年の東海再処理工場の火災事故のために建設が中断されてきた。しかし、槌田氏は、2008年にも予定されているもんじゅの運転再開が実現すれば、ほぼ完成しているＲＥＴＦも完成運転にこぎ着け、軍用プルトニウムの抽出ができることとなるだろうというのである（22－23頁）。
もんじゅが正常に運転されれば、濃縮率98パーセントの軍用プルトニウムが毎年62キログラムも生産できるという。そして、もんじゅは発電を目的とするように偽装されているが、実はこのような軍用プルトニウムを製造することが目的であるとしているのである。
私は、現在の日本政府の具体的な高官が、近い時期に核武装を計画しているという証拠はないと思う。少なくとも、本書にもそのような具体的な証拠は示されていない。しかし、槌田氏の指摘は重要である。
発電用としてはほとんど意味をなさない「もんじゅ」が、なぜプロジェクトとして息の根を止められることなく継続しているのか、そこには発電用原子炉とは異なる目的があるのではないかと疑うに足りる十分な根拠はある。
また、ＲＥＴＦなどという、およそエネルギー政策としては意味のない施設が、なぜ多額の国家予算をつぎ込んで建設されようとしているのかについても、納得のできる説明はなされていない。
そして、日本の軍事力がプルトニウムの生産能力、核弾頭の搭載できるミサイル技術の点で、核武装の可能な段階に到達していることも否定できない。昨秋まで政権の座にあった安倍晋三氏や次の政権をねらっているとされる麻生太郎氏らがかねてからの核武装論者であることも隠れのない事実である。本書に収められたリストによれば、野党の中心をなす民主党の中にも13人もの核武装論者が含まれているという。最近では核武装をテレビで支持していた橋下弁護士が大阪府知事選挙に圧勝するというゆゆしき事態となっている。
だから、私には槌田氏の指摘する日本核武装論には根拠がないとして切り捨てる自信はない。すくなくとも、日本の核武装の野望が現実の政権内部にあり、その計画が現実に進められているかどうかにかかわらず、その時点の政府高官が核武装をしようとすればそれを可能とする事態を招かないように、その技術的な前提となるもんじゅの運転再開をなんとしても食い止め、また、不必要なＲＥＴＦの完成運転を食い止めなければならないと考えるものである。http://www.dcbureau.org/201204097128/national-security-news-service/united-states-circumvented-laws-to-help-japan-accumulate-tons-of-plutonium.htmlUnited States
Circumvented Laws To Help Japan Accumulate Tons of
PlutoniumThe United States deliberately
allowed Japan access to the United States’ most secret nuclear weapons
facilities while it transferred tens of billions of dollars worth of American
tax paid research that has allowed Japan to amass 70 tons of weapons grade
plutonium since the 1980s, a National Security News Service investigation
reveals. These activities repeatedly violated U.S. laws regarding controls of
sensitive nuclear materials that could be diverted to weapons programs in Japan.
The NSNS investigation found that the United States has known about a secret
nuclear weapons program in Japan since the 1960s, according to CIA
reports.
The diversion of U.S. classified technology began during the
Reagan administration after it allowed a $10 billion reactor sale to China.
Japan protested that sensitive technology was being sold to a potential nuclear
adversary. The Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations permitted sensitive
technology and nuclear materials to be transferred to Japan despite laws and
treaties preventing such transfers. Highly sensitive technology on plutonium
separation from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site and Hanford
nuclear weapons complex, as well as tens of billions of dollars worth of breeder
reactor research was turned over to Japan with almost no safeguards against
proliferation. Japanese scientist and technicians were given access to both
Hanford and Savannah River as part of the transfer process.
While Japan
has refrained from deploying nuclear weapons and remains under an umbrella of
U.S. nuclear protection, NSNS has learned that the country has used its
electrical utility companies as a cover to allow the country to amass enough
nuclear weapons materials to build a nuclear arsenal larger than China, India
and Pakistan combined.
This deliberate proliferation by the United States
fuels arguments by countries like Iran that the original nuclear powers engage
in proliferation despite treaty and internal legal obligations. Russia, France,
Great Britain as well as the United States created civilian nuclear power
industries around the world from their weapons complexes that amount to
government-owned or subsidized industries. Israel, like Japan, has been a major
beneficiary and, like Japan, has had nuclear weapons capabilities since the
1960s.
A year ago a natural disaster combined with a man-made tragedy
decimated Northern Japan and came close to making Tokyo, a city of 30 million
people, uninhabitable. Nuclear tragedies plague Japan’s modern history. It is
the only nation in the world attacked with nuclear weapons. In March 2011, after
a tsunami swept on shore, hydrogen explosions and the subsequent meltdowns of
three reactors at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant spewed radiation across the
region. Like the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan will face the
aftermath for generations. A twelve-mile area around the site is considered
uninhabitable. It is a national sacrifice zone.
How Japan ended up in
this nuclear nightmare is a subject the National Security News Service has been
investigating since 1991. We learned that Japan had a dual use nuclear program.
The public program was to develop and provide unlimited energy for the country.
But there was also a secret component, an undeclared nuclear weapons program
that would allow Japan to amass enough nuclear material and technology to become
a major nuclear power on short notice.
That secret effort was hidden in a
nuclear power program that by March 11, 2011– the day the earthquake and tsunami
overwhelmed the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant – had amassed 70 metric tons of
plutonium. Like its use of civilian nuclear power to hide a secret bomb program,
Japan used peaceful space exploration as a cover for developing sophisticated
nuclear weapons delivery systems.
Political leaders in Japan understood
that the only way the Japanese people could be convinced to allow nuclear power
into their lives was if a long line of governments and industry hid any military
application. For that reason, a succession of Japanese governments colluded on a
bomb program disguised as innocent energy and civil space programs. The irony,
of course, is that Japan had gone to war in 1941 to secure its energy future
only to become the sole nation attacked with nuclear weapons.
Energy has
always been Japan’s Achilles’ heel. Her need for oil in the face of an American
embargo triggered Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, and the continued shortage was
a recurring theme in her defeat in that war. Only one act could take more credit
for Japan’s humiliation – the splitting of the atom that gave birth to the
nuclear bomb. Now Japan would turn that same atom to its own purposes ― to
ensure a stable source of energy well into the next century and, equally
important, to ensure that the homeland never again suffered the indignity of
defeat.
Japan approached the nuclear problem the same way it tackled the
electronics and automobile industries. A core group of companies were each given
key tasks with long-term profit potential. Then the government nurtured these
companies with whatever financial, technological and regulatory support needed
to assure their success. The strategy worked brilliantly to bring Japan from
post-war oblivion to economic dominance in a single generation.
The five
companies designated for the development of nuclear technologies had to make
major strides beyond the conventional light water reactors that had become
fixtures in Japan under U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace
program in the 1950s. Japan would have to do what the Americans and Europeans
had failed to do – make an experimental breeder program a commercial success.
Their hubris convinced them that they could. The Japanese, after all, were the
masters of the industrial process. They had turned out automobiles, televisions
and microchips superior to the Americans, with better quality and at less cost.
Nuclear accidents are almost always the result of human error: sloppy operators
without the proper education or training or who did not install enough
redundancies. Such things happen to Americans and Russians, but not to
Japanese.
As China, North Korea, India and Pakistan developed nuclear
weapon systems, Japan and her Western allies strengthened their alliances to
counter the burgeoning threat. From a secret meeting between U.S. President
Lyndon Johnson and Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in the 1960s and the
participation of several subsequent American and Japanese leaders, the secret
transfer of nuclear technology was part of an international strategy to fortify
Japan against an ever-escalating East Asian arms race. This policy culminated
during the Reagan administration in legislation that dramatically changed U.S.
policy. The United States ceded virtually all control of U.S.-origin nuclear
materials shipped to Japan.
To the detriment of the world and her people,
the Japanese government exploited the Japanese public’s well-known abhorrence of
nuclear weapons to discourage the media and historians from delving into its
nuclear weapons activities. Consequently, until the March 2011 tragedy, the
Japanese nuclear industry had largely remained hidden from critical eyes. The
less than thorough International Atomic Energy Agency, the world’s proliferation
safeguard agency, also turned a blind eye.
In a rare glimpse of a
Japanese industry that has remained top secret for so many decades, our
investigation raises serious concerns about Japanese and Western nuclear
policies and the officials who shaped those policies during and after the Cold
War. International corporations and officials sacrificed the safety and security
of the public to carry out the deception. Under the guise of a peaceful nuclear
power program, they made huge profits.
F-Go: The First Japanese Nuclear
Weapons Program
In the early 1940s, with the world locked in the bloodiest
conflict in human history, scientists in Germany, Great Britain, the United
States and Japan struggled to unlock from the atom a weapon of almost
inconceivable power. This race to turn theory into devastating reality formed a
secret subtext to the war that destroyed millions of lives using industrial
warfare. In the area of theoretical physics, Japan was as advanced as her
European and American rivals. She lacked only the raw materials and the sheer
industrial excess to turn those materials into an atomic bomb. But Japan’s war
machine was nothing if not resourceful.
Yoshio Nishina
Since 1940,
the Japanese had been aggressively researching the science of the nuclear chain
reaction. Dr. Yoshio Nishina had been nominated for the Nobel Prize for his
pre-war work in nuclear physics. Now he and a team of young scientists worked
tirelessly at the Riken, the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research, to
beat the Americans to the bomb. After two years of preliminary research, the
atom bomb program called F-Go began in Kyoto in 1942. By 1943, Japan’s Manhattan
Project had not only produced a cyclotron that could separate bomb-grade
uranium, but also had developed a team of nuclear scientists with the knowledge
to unleash the atom’s unknown
power. As America built a uranium
enrichment plant in the Washington desert so enormous it drew every watt of
electricity from the Grand Coulee Dam, the Japanese scoured their empire for
enough raw uranium to make their own bomb, with only limited
success.
Japan looked to Nazi Germany for help. The Nazis, too, had been
pursuing the nuclear bomb. But, by early 1945, the Allies were on the Rhine and
the Russians had taken Prussia. In a last-ditch effort, Hitler dispatched a
U-boat to Japan loaded with 1,200 pounds of uranium. The submarine never
arrived. American warships captured it in May 1945. Two Japanese officers on
board the submarine committed suicide and the shipment of uranium was diverted
to Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for use in the American Manhattan Project. Without the
uranium, Japan could not produce more than one or two small atomic
bombs.
As the bomb programs in both countries neared completion in 1944,
General Douglas MacArthur’s island-hopping campaign drew closer to Japan’s home
islands. Fleets of B-29 bombers rained fire on Tokyo and other major cities.
Nishina had to move his effort to the tiny hamlet of Hungman in what is now
North Korea. The move cost the Japanese program three months.
On August
6, 1945, the Enola Gay dropped a single atomic bomb over Hiroshima. The blast
killed more than 70,000 people outright, and in the days and weeks to come
thousands more succumbed.
When word of the blast reached Nishina, he knew
immediately that the Americans had beaten him to the prize. But he also had
implicit confirmation that his own atomic bomb could work. Nishina and his team
worked tirelessly to ready their own test. Historians such as Robert Wilcox and
Atlanta Journal Constitution writer David Snell believe that they succeeded.
Wilcox writes that on August 12, 1945 – three days after the Nagasaki bombing
and three days before Japan signed the articles of surrender – Japan tested a
partially successful bomb in Hungnam. By then the effort was merely symbolic.
Japan lacked the means to produce more weapons or to deliver them accurately to
the United States.
As Japan rebuilt after the war, the atomic bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki came to represent the folly of Japan’s imperial
aspirations as well as American inhumanity toward the Japanese. The Japanese
people held nuclear weapons in abhorrence. Japan’s leaders shared that view,
but, having been on the receiving end of nuclear warfare, also developed a
special appreciation for the bomb’s strategic value.
As the war ended,
thousands of American troops occupied Japan. After the nuclear attacks on Japan,
the United States feared that the desire and ability to create this power would
spread throughout the world. Washington learned that Japan had been much closer
to its own nuclear bomb than previously thought. Destroying Japan’s
nuclear-weapons capability became a high priority. In addition to negotiating
international non-proliferation agreements, U.S. occupation troops destroyed
several cyclotrons and other vestiges of Japan’s atomic bomb project to prevent
Japan from resuming its nuclear program. Though the troops could demolish the
physical remnants of the F-Go project, they could not destroy the enormous body
of knowledge Nishina and his team had accumulated during the war.
The
Beginning the Japan’s Nuclear Program
In the years to come the men behind
F-Go would become the leaders of Japan’s nuclear power program. Their first
priority was to stockpile enough uranium to ensure that nuclear research could
continue in Japan.
The war and the atomic blasts that ended it left a
strong and enduring impression on the Japanese people. They abhorred the
destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But the Japanese leadership recognized
that in nuclear power there was an alternative to foreign energy dependence, a
dependence that had hindered Japan since her entry into the industrial
era.
With the surrender of Japan, the United States became the preeminent
power in the Pacific. But that position was challenged in 1949 with the
communist victory in China and successful nuclear tests by the Soviet Union. The
communists were challenging America in the Pacific, and Japan suddenly shifted
from vanquished adversary to valuable ally.
The United States was
completely unprepared when North Korean troops swarmed south in 1952. Soon
poorly armed, under-trained American Marines were surrounded in Pusan with their
backs to the sea. For the first of many times during the Korean War, the
American military commander, Gen. Douglass MacArthur, lobbied President Truman
to use nuclear weapons.
Those weapons were stored on the Japanese island
of Okinawa. While American troops faced annihilation in Pusan, American B-29s
waited with engines running to bomb targets in China and Korea. Later in the
war, when Chinese troops entered Korea, nuclear-laden bombers flying from Japan
would actually penetrate Chinese and North Korean airspace. One, an F-103 jet
fighter bomber, was shot down.
The Korean War is an important milestone
for Japan. Only seven years after the most humiliating defeat in its
three-thousand-year history, Japan served as the staging ground for the same
military that had defeated her. Japan’s own military at the time was practically
nonexistent. As humiliating as the American servicemen who frequented Tokyo’s
nickel brothels was the realization that Japan’s defense was wholly in American
hands. As Truman played the game of nuclear brinkmanship with the Chinese, it
became apparent that Japan’s defense now relied on the same nuclear bombs that
had sealed her World War II defeat.
In the early 1950s, the United States
aggressively urged Tokyo to get involved in the nuclear power business. Having
witnessed the destructive power of nuclear energy, President Eisenhower was
determined to keep it under strict control. He also realized that the world
would never accept a complete U.S. monopoly on atom-splitting technology, so he
developed an alternative ― Atoms for Peace. Eisenhower gave resource-starved
countries like Japan and India nuclear power reactors as a form of technical,
economic and moral support. Lacking the indigenous resources to rebuild its
economy and infrastructure, Japan quickly turned to nuclear power as the answer
for its chronically energy-starved economy.
With the help of the American
Atoms for Peace program, Japan began to develop a full-scale nuclear power
industry. The Japanese sent scores of scientists to America for training in
nuclear energy development. Desperate to regain a foothold in the international
arena and reclaim its sovereignty and power after the war, the Japanese
government willingly spent scarce funding on research labs and nuclear
reactors.
Japan’s wartime experience had prepared her to build a nuclear
industry from scratch, but with Atoms for Peace, it was cheaper to import
complete reactors from the West.
Atoms for Peace supported British and
Canadian nuclear exports as well as American. Britain went first, selling its
Magnox plant to Japan. General Electric and Westinghouse rapidly secured the
rest of the industry, selling reactor designs and components to Japan at
exorbitant prices. The Japanese industry quickly became a model for other Atoms
for Peace countries. A generation of brilliant young Japanese scientists came of
age during this period, all committed to the full exploitation of nuclear
energy.
Once the industry was vitalized, Japan resumed its own nuclear
research independent from the United States. Encouraged by the Americans, in
1956 Japan’s bureaucrats mapped out a plan to exploit the entire nuclear fuel
cycle. At that time the concept was only theoretical, no more a reality than the
atomic bomb was when Einstein penned his infamous letter to Roosevelt in 1939.
According to the theory, plutonium could be separated from the spent fuel burned
in conventional reactors and used to fuel new “breeder reactors.” No one had yet
been able to make it work, but this was the dawn of the age of technology.
Scientists in Japan, America and Europe were intoxicated with the possibilities
of scientific advancements. Japan’s central planners and bureaucrats were
equally enthusiastic. The breeder reactor plan would make the most efficient use
of the raw uranium Japan imported from the United States. It would wean Japan
from her dependence on American energy and also create an enormous stockpile of
plutonium – the most powerful and difficult to obtain bomb
material.
Secret Cold War Nuclear Policies
Prime Minister Sato
with President Johnson
In October 1964, communist China stunned the world by
detonating its first nuclear bomb. The world was caught by surprise, but nowhere
were emotions as strong as in Japan. Three months later Japanese Prime Minister
Eisaku Sato went to Washington for secret talks with President Lyndon Johnson.
Sato gave LBJ an extraordinary ultimatum: if the United States did not guarantee
Japan’s security against nuclear attack, Japan would develop a nuclear arsenal.
The ultimatum forced LBJ to extend the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” over Japan.
Ironically, this guarantee later enabled Sato to establish Japan’s Three
Non-Nuclear Principles: to never own or produce nuclear weapons or allow them on
Japanese territory. The policy won Sato the Nobel Prize for Peace. The Japanese
public and the rest of the world never knew that these three principles were
never fully enforced, and Sato allowed the secret nuclear weapons program to go
on.
In the years to come, thousands of U.S. nuclear weapons would pass
through Japanese ports and American bases in Japan. Even before Sato’s historic
meeting with LBJ, Japan had quietly agreed to officially ignore U.S. nuclear
weapons stored in Japan. Japanese officials were shrewd enough to put nothing
down on paper, but U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo Edwin O. Reischauer disclosed the
pact in a 1981 newspaper interview. In 1960, the Japanese government had
verbally agreed to allow nuclear-armed American warships access to Japanese
ports and territorial waters. Several current and former U.S. and Japanese
officials confirm Ambassador Reischauer’s interpretation, including the former
Japanese Ambassador in Washington, Takezo Shimoda.
When asked about these
issues in the 1980s, the Japanese government flatly denied there was any such
understanding and said it was “inconceivable” that it had a different
interpretation of the treaty conditions than the United States. Nonetheless,
after Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki ordered his Foreign Ministry to investigate
the facts, the best it could do was to say it could find no written records of
the pact.
Declassified U.S. government documents make a mockery of the
Three Non-Nuclear Principles. The papers reveal that Japanese government
officials ignored evidence that the United States was routinely bringing nuclear
weapons into Japanese ports. American military planners took Japan’s silence as
tacit permission to carry nuclear weapons into Japanese harbors. The American
aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk, home ported for decades in Yokohama, routinely
carried a small arsenal of nuclear weapons.
Japan even participated in
joint military exercises in which U.S. forces simulated the use of nuclear
weapons. These revelations underline the dichotomy between the Japanese
government’s public policies and its actions regarding nuclear
weapons.
One of the pivotal debates in Japan during the early 1970s was
whether to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The treaty basically
froze the nuclear status quo. The five nuclear powers retained their arsenals
while the rest of the world pledged to abstain from nuclear weapons. More than a
hundred countries signed the treaty. The only notable exceptions were the few
states that held open the nuclear option: India, Pakistan, Israel and Japan. The
debate, like most decisions on these issues in Japan, was not carried out in a
public forum. But the Americans were listening, and what they heard put Japan’s
nuclear ambitions in a completely new light.
Yasuhiro Nakasone was
Director of the Japanese Defense Agency and one of a new generation of
pro-nuclear politicians. Though he was not in favor of immediate nuclear
armament, he opposed any action that would limit Japan’s right to develop
nuclear weapons in the future. Nakasone was one of the principal authors of a
1969 policy paper that said in a chapter on national security: “For the
time-being Japan’s policy will be not to possess nuclear weapons. But it will
always maintain the economic and technical potential to manufacture nuclear
weapons and will see to it that Japan won’t accept outside interference on this
matter.”
Six years later Nakasone was again embroiled in the nuclear
debate. At stake was Japan’s ability to go nuclear and the biggest prize in
Japanese politics – the prime minister’s gavel. Nakasone assured his rise to
prime minister by outwardly supporting the NPT. The price for Japan’s
cooperation was President Gerald Ford’s pledge not to interfere with Japan’s
nuclear programs, even when they included material and technology ideally suited
to nuclear weapons use. With Ford’s guarantee, Japan finally ratified the NPT in
1976. Japan’s nuclear commerce continued unabated. The United States continued
to supply enriched uranium to Japanese reactors and allowed the spent fuel to be
reprocessed in Europe and the plutonium shipped back to Japan, where it was
stockpiled for future use in breeder reactors.
Stopping the Spread of
Fissile Material
Jimmy Carter Tours TMI Control Room
After Jimmy
Carter won the presidency in 1976, he instituted an aggressive policy to control
the spread of fissile materials. As a former nuclear reactor engineer on a Navy
submarine, Carter knew better than any other world leader the immense power
locked up in plutonium and highly enriched uranium. He was determined to keep it
out of the hands of even our closest non-nuclear allies – including
Japan.
Carter had good reason for this policy. Despite Japan’s
ratification of the NPT in 1976, a study conducted for the CIA the following
year named Japan as one of the three countries most able to go nuclear before
1980. Only the Japanese people’s historic opposition to nuclear weapons argued
against Japanese deployment. Every other factor argued for a Japanese nuclear
capability. By now the CIA – and its more secretive sister agency, the NSA ― had
learned the position of Japan’s inner circle.
Carter knew the incredibly
volatile effect plutonium would have on world stability. Plutonium is the single
most difficult to obtain ingredient of nuclear bombs. Even relatively backward
countries – and some terrorist groups – now possess the technology to turn
plutonium or highly enriched uranium into a nuclear weapon. But refining
plutonium or enriching uranium is an extremely difficult, costly task. Carter
knew that by limiting the spread of plutonium and uranium, he could control the
spread of nuclear weapons. He made preventing the spread of plutonium the
cornerstone of his nuclear non-proliferation policy.
The Japanese were
shocked when Carter entered office and promptly pushed through Congress the 1978
Non-Proliferation Act, which subjected every uranium and plutonium shipment to
congressional approval and blocked a host of sensitive nuclear technologies from
Japan. Carter was determined not to transfer nuclear technology or materials
that Japan could use to make nuclear weapons. The decision was hugely unpopular
in America’s nuclear establishment as well. America’s nuclear scientists had
expected much from Carter since he was one of them: someone who knew and
understood nuclear energy.
Carter’s efforts ended America’s plans to
reprocess spent nuclear fuel. Carter stopped reprocessing because he feared the
consequences of Korean or Taiwan stockpiling plutonium. He believed it would
lead to an Asian arms race involving Japan and China as well as Korea or
Taiwan.
Carter’s U.S. nuclear doctrine was enormously unpopular among
America’s nuclear science elite, who viewed a plutonium-based fuel cycle as the
future of nuclear energy. They saw the atom as the solution to the problems that
had stalled America’s great economic boom – acid rain from coal, shortages and
embargos of oil. With an almost inexhaustible supply of cheap, clean nuclear
energy, America would reclaim its position as the world’s unquestioned economic
leader. But for many it went beyond even that. If America could complete the
fuel-cycle – complete the nuclear circle, all of humanity could be lifted up by
the nuclear bootstrap. At research centers around the country and in the
Department of Energy’s Forrestal Building on Washington’s Independence Avenue,
enthusiasm for the breeder program reached almost a religious
crescendo.
If the breeder reactor was going to revolutionize the world’s
nuclear economy, went the thinking in America’s nuclear establishment, the
United States would have to share it with her allies in Europe and Japan. The
very cornerstone of science is the free exchange of information, and the
American scientists shared openly with their European and Japanese colleagues.
The cooperation ran both ways. The breeder reactor was proving to be a
monumental technical challenge, and DOE was eager to learn from the mistakes of
Germany, Britain and France, all of which had been working on the problem nearly
as long as the United States. Carter’s policies hindered America’s efforts to
develop and share a plutonium-based nuclear energy cycle.
To the chagrin
of the powerful nuclear weapons and nuclear power lobbies, Carter abandoned the
idea of a new nuclear renaissance. Carter’s administration ushered in an era of
reduced nuclear trade and an interruption to the free flow of ideas among
scientists. For men like Richard T. Kennedy and Ben Rusche at the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and Harry Bengelsdorf at the U.S. Department of Energy,
the restraints were completely unacceptable. Jimmy Carter’s re-election defeat
brought the nuclear establishment another opportunity.
Reversing Course –
Reagan Undermines Carter’s Policies
Richard Kennedy
One of the most
passionate nuclear believers was a career bureaucrat named Richard Kennedy. A
former Army officer, he labored in obscurity at the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, his career held hostage by his vehement opposition to President
Carter’s nuclear policies. All of that changed after Ronald Reagan’s election in
1980. One of Reagan’s first acts as president was to effectively reverse
Carter’s nuclear doctrine, which had barred the United States from using
plutonium in civilian power projects with America’s friends or
adversaries.
Reagan made Kennedy his right-hand man for nuclear affairs.
From his new post as Ambassador at Large for Nuclear Energy, Kennedy oversaw the
dismantling of the Carter policies he despised. The new administration
rejuvenated American and international reliance on plutonium.
But one
legacy of the Carter years hobbled America’s headlong leap into international
nuclear commerce. Carter had pushed through Congress in 1978 the Atomic Energy
Act, a sweeping piece of legislation that strictly limited how foreign countries
could import and use nuclear materials originating in the United States. Under
the Act, Congress had to approve every single shipment of reactor fuel that
crossed an international border. The law was an insufferable impediment to
Kennedy’s vision of unfettered nuclear commerce. So he set out to circumvent
it.
In the early days of the Reagan buildup, as the massive injection of
cash into America’s conventional and nuclear war-making industries dramatically
increased, the administration force-fed money to the nuclear scientists
designing new warheads and attempting to solve the nuclear breeder reactor
conundrum.
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８８８（スリーエイト） 
Name 
」の日本でのプロモーションのために版元である集英社が招いたもの。
より抜粋。
このメディアは取扱いに注意を要すると
04/04
野田佳彦首相と枝野幸男経済産業相ら３閣僚は６日、関西電力大飯（おおい）原発３、４号機（福井県おおい町）の再稼働問題を協議し、再稼働を認める際の新しい安全基準を正式に決定した。ただ、格納容器のベント（排気）時に放射性物質を取り除くフィルターの設置など重要な対策でも、先送りを認め、期限は電力会社任せとなった。
（上）藤間教授。津波防災を研究し、国内や海外の津波常襲地帯や被災地を訪ねる。
外国の悪人どもが考えてる事にはついていけませんな。
今まで搾取、捏造の歴史と言っても過言ではないな。
世界中を巻き込んでスケールが大きいなんて、感心している場合じ
日本も相当な痛手だし、アメリカ国債は戻ってこない？
akko0980 3 週間前
アジアから横領したゴールドを返還して、日本にプールして、世界
金融制度が変われば、借金による金利の支払いとか、そういう仕組
日本は正直経済を進めて、アジアを発展させたという歴史的な事実
国債は直接的にはいってはこないけれども、新しい経済の仕組みが
いま、日本のメディアや政治の動きを見ると、財政危機を取り上げ
まったく捏造の歴史と詐欺そのものです。あのビデオでは「びっく
以上は「ＹＯＵ－ＴＵＢＥ」より
米国のやることは、強盗ギャングと同じです。下手に文句を言えば、軍事力で脅すのですから、手に負えません。国際社会一致して追い詰めるしか方法がありません。それにしても英国が良くやってくれたものです。 以上